


Friday	7:45	7:00		9:31
Shabbos		1:45/6:00	(Maariv 9:05)	9:31
Sunday		7:45		9:31



IMPORTANCE OF

The *Sifri* translates לא תגורו מפני איש as לא תיראו – an instruction to a judge not to fear any man. The *Sifri* adds that a judge may be afraid of a litigant who, if disappointed in the outcome of his case, may exact vengeance on the judge by killing his son, burning his crops or destroying his plantings. Therefore, the *Posuk* says - don't be afraid. The *Kli Chemdah* asks, there is no requirement that one suffer a monetary loss in order to save someone else's assets, albeit to fulfill the *mitzvah* of *Hashovas Aveidah*. Why then must a judge suffer such a threatened loss by adjudicating a case? The *Kli Chemdah* answers that one need not suffer a loss to fulfill *Hashovas Aveidah* because it is no more than a *mitzvah* לבנו. However, judging is a *mitzvah* במקום, as the *Posuk* continues: כי המשפט לאלוקים הוא, and therefore a judge is obligated to render a just Halachic ruling without fear. Even if a judge should decide to appease a difficult litigant out of his own pocket rather than judge the case, he will transgress לא תגורו because he is not fulfilling Hashem's mandate that disputes be decided by the *Torah* in a *Din Torah*. What about the physical threat mentioned by the *Sifri*? Must a judge risk his son's life to fulfill that mandate? It certainly does not seem to be one of the 3 sins that require self-sacrifice! The *Bach* (ור"מ 12) rules clearly against the *Sifri* that one need not risk a life to fulfill this mandate. However there may be support for *Mesiras Nefesh* even if משפט is not one of the 3 cardinal sins. The *Mishnah* משחת שכן suggests that some *mitzvos* are obligatory even if they involve *Mesiras Nefesh* because *Mesiras Nefesh* is part of the *mitzvah*. For example, going out to fight in a מלחמת מצוה. Does not war require one to risk his life, even if it is not one of the 3 sins? But risking one's life is the only way to fulfill it. The *Sifri* may have held that risk is a factor in the prohibition of לא תגורו as well. To avoid transgressing the prohibition, one must ignore the possibility that it may lead to *Mesiras Nefesh* and proceed to judge despite the risk.

QUESTION OF THE WEEK:

When would adding *Milchig* to *Fleishig* make something *Pareve*?

ANSWER TO LAST WEEK:

(What may be eaten *Shabbos* only if prepared on *Shabbos*, but not before?)
The *Mishna Berurah* (254:3) states that food cooked before *Shabbos* which did not reach the status of *מאכל בן דרוסקא*, may not be completed and eaten on *Shabbos*. However, the *Gemara* (*Shabbos* 38a) states that one who cooked on *Shabbos* בשוגג is permitted to eat what he cooked.

DIN'S CORNER:

When *Tisha B'Av* is observed on Sunday, one may eat without restriction during *Shalosh Seudos*, preferably only with family, but may only eat up until sunset. After sunset, one may not eat, drink or wash, but one may sit normally and wear shoes until *Maariv*. Customarily, at the conclusion of *Shabbos*, one recites the words: ברוך המבדיל בין קודש לחול at home, changes into non-*Shabbos* clothing, and goes to *daven Maariv*. If one did not say it, he removes his shoes after *Borchu*. (*Kitzur* 125:1)

DID YOU KNOW THAT

The *Shulchan Aruch* (או"ח 47:3-4) rules that one who writes words of *Torah* (without speaking) was obligated to have said previously, whereas one who only has *Torah* thoughts (without speaking) need not have said the *berachos*. The *GRA* holds that for *Torah* thoughts one must also say *berachos*. Accordingly, the *Binyan Olam* (6) ruled that if one is waiting before the words: "שירה חדשה" in order to say *Kedusha* or to answer *Kadish* (before beginning his own *Shemonah Esrei*), he may not think words of *Torah* because הרורו כדיבור דמי - thinking is the equivalent of speaking, thus constituting a הפסק (interruption). However, the *Biur Halacha* explains that the *GRA* requires *berachos* prior to *Torah* thoughts on their own merit - for thinking itself, and not because it somehow constitutes speaking. The *Beis Yosef* (554) as well, cites a ruling of the *Agur* who allows one to think *Torah* thoughts on *Tisha B'Av*, holding that הרורו לאו כדיבור דמי. Yet, it may very well be permitted even if we say הרורו כדיבור דמי. R' Akiva Eiger (ש"ת 30) suggested to his uncle that if כתיבה כדיבור דמי (writing is the equivalent of speaking), as requiring ברכות התורה before writing implies, how is a *Sofer* ever able to write *Hashem's* name in a *Sefer Torah*? Would not the act of writing it constitute saying it, something we may not do today? He concludes that if one specifically wishes his writing to not constitute reading, he can do so. The *Har Tzvi* (1:42) suggests that the same may hold true regarding thoughts as well. Even if generally הרורו כדיבור דמי, one could specifically intend his *Torah* thoughts to not constitute speaking, thus permitting it at "שירה חדשה" and on *Tisha B'Av*.

A Lesson Can Be Learned From:

A Talmid once visited Rav Shach ZTL and found him on the verge of tears. The Talmid asked Rav Shach what disturbed him so, and Rav Shach said: "A couple came to see me with their son regarding a *Shidduch*. The son had met a girl and was convinced that she was his *Basherte*. He described her in glowing terms, as possessing all the fine qualities and character traits that he could hope for. Then the parents spoke up, agreeing with their son's assessment, but they had recently discovered that the young lady's parents had not observed the laws of *Taharas HaMishpacha* until recently, and this disturbed them as they were a fine, respected *Yichus'dik* family and they felt that this was a significant blemish. The tension between parents and son was high, and they were as strongly against the *shidduch* as the son was for it. They wanted my opinion. I don't know why people come to me with such difficult questions, as if I am some authority. I told them to go to a true *Gadol* like the *Steipler*, but they refused. I mentioned a few other *Gedolim* but they only wanted my opinion. So I told them to give me a few days time, but people make a mistake coming to me". A week later, the Talmid found Rav Shach in good spirits and asked how the issue had been resolved. Rav Shach said: "I took out a *Tehilim* and asked Hashem to give me wisdom. Then I searched through the *Shulchan Aruch*, looking for mention of any objection to marriage with someone who was not conceived B'Taharah. I could not find any. So I told them that if everything else was in order, to finalize the *Shidduch*, and they agreed".

P.S. *Shalosh Seudos* will not be eaten in Shul this week. Please note the earlier *Mincha*.

This issue is dedicated:

ולד"ג אבי מורי הרב אהרן זאב ב"ר שמואל ולד"ג אמי מורתי מלכה ב"ר יהודה לייבוש הלוי

Dedications (\$18) and appreciations may be sent to: Kehilas Prozdor, 8 GreenHill Lane, Spring Valley, N.Y. 10977 (845) 354-7240

As this contains *Divrei Torah* and partial *Pesukim*, it should be treated with proper respect, both during and after use

ולע"ג יהודה לייבוש ב"ר אברהם יום טוב הלוי ולע"ג פערל ב"ר יצחק הלוי ולע"ג אברהם ב"ר יעקב חיים ולע"ג רבקה ב"ר מנחם מאיר